Tyler Gannon's point is that we should adopt policies that will encourage people to invest in the "right" form of human capital as quickly as possible, since specializing in the sector in which we enjoy a comparative advantage will lead to the greatest amount of gains from trade. To focus the analysis, let's consider a couple of possible scenarios about human capital "investment":
Scenario 1: human capital investment is not costly (but also not immediate).
Here, compensating the losers makes no difference on the incentive to switch sectors. Even the most modest wage differential between the two sectors will leave an incentive for workers to gravitate towards higher-wage professions.
Here, compensating the losers makes no difference on the incentive to switch sectors. Even the most modest wage differential between the two sectors will leave an incentive for workers to gravitate towards higher-wage professions.
Scenario 2: human capital investment is costly (and also not immediate).
Here, not only does it take time to learn about higher-paying jobs in other sectors and find them, but it also costs a certain amount of your income to learn the new trade. Thus, the incentive to switch sectors will be motivated by: (1) the wage differential (net of taxes and wage subsidies), (Wc - t) - (Ww + s); and (2) the cost of re-investing in the new skills needed to become proficient in that sector (C), where:
Wc = Wage in the cloth (export) sector;
Ww = Wage in the wine (import) sector;
t = Tax on each cloth worker (= 0 for a shift to free trade with no transfer);
s = Subsidy to each wine worker (ditto).
Assume that t < Wc - Ww, which would be the case if we raised wine workers' incomes just to the level needed to attain autarky utility. This would leave all of the net gains to be enjoyed by the cloth workers. (Also note that in a static model we also require a government budget-balance condition which implies that t*Lc = s*Lw.)
In this case, wine makers stuck in a cruel transition mechanism (say, because Tyler is their "benevolent dictator") will invest in retraining as long as the benefit is at least as much as the investment cost, i.e. if Wc - Ww ≥ C; wine makers living it up in a redistributionist nannystate will only retrain if (Wc - t) - (Ww + s) ≥ C. Note that the second condition requires the cost of reinvesting to be lower than would be the case in the transfer-less transition to free trade, which means current workers are less likely to reinvest, and the transition to full specialization will be slower. Future generations, however will begin their "careers" by investing in the "right" types of human capital (and surely will also hope and pray that the economy never ever changes again!). As the old fogies who foolishly misinvested in wine-making at the start of their lives die off, we reach the free trade equilibrium with full gains from trade.
But, of course there are problems with even this analysis. What if people can't afford the cost of retraining? Even if the benefits justify the cost, workers might not be able to reinvest because the lower wage now received in the wine sector is barely enough to cover a subsistence level of consumption (call this minimum subsistence expenditure "E"), and will not leave sufficient additional funds to cover the cost. One might argue that credit markets could solve this by allowing you to take out a loan against your future earnings, but credit markets often fail when information is imperfect and lenders may not be willing to give loans. In this case, without the ability to take out a loan, investment can only occur in the cruel transferless world if Wc - Ww ≥ C (incentive must be sufficient), and Ww - E ≥ C (the cost must be feasible). One can imagine a set of parameters where (Wc - t) - (Ww + s) ≥ C and Ww + s - E ≥ C, but Ww - E < C. In other words, there will be sufficient incentive to reinvestment under BOTH policy regimes (transfer and no transfer), but the cost of re-investment is only affordable with the transfer. Thus it is possible that the transfer might actually speed up the rate of convergence to the desired free-trade level of specialization and the hands-off approach will not only slow down this convergence, but will even worsen and perpetuate inequality. Whether this is indeed the case is an empirical question, so make sure you enroll in my econometrics course in the spring!
Also, what if the cost of acquiring cloth-making skills increases (which we might expect since it will be the cloth makers - who earn higher wages using their time to produce cloth - who will be needed to train all of these new cloth makers)? If this is the case then one might imagine how, over time, this might lead to a widening of the gap between "winners" and "losers" as the children of wine workers (who themselves could not afford to invest in wine retraining) now also cannot afford the (rising) cost of training their children to achieve the goal of attaining a better career in the cloth sector.
Here, not only does it take time to learn about higher-paying jobs in other sectors and find them, but it also costs a certain amount of your income to learn the new trade. Thus, the incentive to switch sectors will be motivated by: (1) the wage differential (net of taxes and wage subsidies), (Wc - t) - (Ww + s); and (2) the cost of re-investing in the new skills needed to become proficient in that sector (C), where:
Wc = Wage in the cloth (export) sector;
Ww = Wage in the wine (import) sector;
t = Tax on each cloth worker (= 0 for a shift to free trade with no transfer);
s = Subsidy to each wine worker (ditto).
Assume that t < Wc - Ww, which would be the case if we raised wine workers' incomes just to the level needed to attain autarky utility. This would leave all of the net gains to be enjoyed by the cloth workers. (Also note that in a static model we also require a government budget-balance condition which implies that t*Lc = s*Lw.)
In this case, wine makers stuck in a cruel transition mechanism (say, because Tyler is their "benevolent dictator") will invest in retraining as long as the benefit is at least as much as the investment cost, i.e. if Wc - Ww ≥ C; wine makers living it up in a redistributionist nannystate will only retrain if (Wc - t) - (Ww + s) ≥ C. Note that the second condition requires the cost of reinvesting to be lower than would be the case in the transfer-less transition to free trade, which means current workers are less likely to reinvest, and the transition to full specialization will be slower. Future generations, however will begin their "careers" by investing in the "right" types of human capital (and surely will also hope and pray that the economy never ever changes again!). As the old fogies who foolishly misinvested in wine-making at the start of their lives die off, we reach the free trade equilibrium with full gains from trade.
But, of course there are problems with even this analysis. What if people can't afford the cost of retraining? Even if the benefits justify the cost, workers might not be able to reinvest because the lower wage now received in the wine sector is barely enough to cover a subsistence level of consumption (call this minimum subsistence expenditure "E"), and will not leave sufficient additional funds to cover the cost. One might argue that credit markets could solve this by allowing you to take out a loan against your future earnings, but credit markets often fail when information is imperfect and lenders may not be willing to give loans. In this case, without the ability to take out a loan, investment can only occur in the cruel transferless world if Wc - Ww ≥ C (incentive must be sufficient), and Ww - E ≥ C (the cost must be feasible). One can imagine a set of parameters where (Wc - t) - (Ww + s) ≥ C and Ww + s - E ≥ C, but Ww - E < C. In other words, there will be sufficient incentive to reinvestment under BOTH policy regimes (transfer and no transfer), but the cost of re-investment is only affordable with the transfer. Thus it is possible that the transfer might actually speed up the rate of convergence to the desired free-trade level of specialization and the hands-off approach will not only slow down this convergence, but will even worsen and perpetuate inequality. Whether this is indeed the case is an empirical question, so make sure you enroll in my econometrics course in the spring!
Also, what if the cost of acquiring cloth-making skills increases (which we might expect since it will be the cloth makers - who earn higher wages using their time to produce cloth - who will be needed to train all of these new cloth makers)? If this is the case then one might imagine how, over time, this might lead to a widening of the gap between "winners" and "losers" as the children of wine workers (who themselves could not afford to invest in wine retraining) now also cannot afford the (rising) cost of training their children to achieve the goal of attaining a better career in the cloth sector.